[Rhodes22-list] Political - long read on middle east

[Tootle]

Folks,

This is a long read.  It is circulating the inter net.  Just delete unless
you want to read an alternative viewpoint about middle east .  I am sure
that Bill Effros, Slim, Ron should be amoung those who should just delete
the following:

This 'other side of the hill' report on the ISG was written from theal-Qaeda
viewpoint ---  perspective 

Every war has winners and losers.  The Iraq Study Group (ISG) report is
written from the perspective of the latter.  It shows how the United States,
by playing an overwhelmingly strong hand with breathtaking ineptitude, has
foreclosed all options leading to victory, even if victory is down-defined
to mean simply a stable Iraq.  With no path to success, defeat and a rapid
U.S. pullout are inevitable.

The following report is a paragraph-by-paragraph mirror-image of the ISG
report written from the perspective of the winners, specifically al-Qaeda. 
It is more realistic than the ISG report because it shows the many near- and
intermediate-term options opening to the winners.  It shows that al-Qaeda,
Baathists, Sunni insurgents, and “dead-enders,” through a campaign of
terror, have been able to sow chaos in Iraq, make the chaos self-amplifying,
and render the “government” of “Iraq” powerless.  More importantly, it shows
how turning Iraq into a failed state can open the way to meeting critical
goals of al-Qaeda: defeating the United States, nullifying the credibility
of the United States in the Middle East and much of the rest of the world,
spurring turmoil throughout the Middle East, weakening and then toppling
governments in Saudi Arabia, the smaller Gulf states, Jordan, and Egypt,
devastating Western economies, and perhaps leading to a nuclear strike
against Israel or the United States.

Why write from the perspective of al-Qaeda, which makes up a tiny fraction
of the forces of chaos?  Because al-Qaeda, from the beginning, has had the
broadest strategic view of any of the players and because it, in
coordination (or at least in parallel) with other Sunni insurgents, is
pursuing these goals successfully.  Its campaign of terror has proven to be
the tactic that, ruthlessly pursued, has placed it on the path to reach many
strategic objectives.  Would that the United States had been as able to have
successful tactics, a successful strategy, and the intelligence (in the
sense of brainpower) to link the one to the other!

 -------   Al-Qaeda in Iraq Study Group Report:  ------  Executive Summary  
------

The situation in Iraq is proceeding far better, and far faster, than we had
dared hope, and prospects for us to achieve our goals are improving at a
quickening pace.  We have many paths to many victories.  Victory will build
on victory, and we see new vistas of opportunity unfolding before our eyes
every day.

In this report, we make a number of recommendations for actions to be taken
in Iraq and the region. Actions to be taken against the United States will
be the subject of a later report, but our victory in Iraq and the region
will help us in these future actions.  Our most important recommendation
calls for creating more chaos in Iraq in order to undermine the pathetic
“government” of Iraq (which cannot govern even the Green Zone) and public
opinion in the United States.  Undermining U.S. opinion and the Iraqi
“government” are inseparable and mutually reinforcing.  As U.S. support for
the war collapses, ordinary Iraqis and members of the Iraqi government alike
will be forced to turn to their sects for protection.  This will deprive the
government of any support and break Iraq apart, making the government
collapse. And as the government collapses, U.S. citizens will see that there
is no “Iraq” to defend, so their support for the war will collapse.  In
fact, U.S. opinion has turned decisively against the war, and a few
spectacular attacks, now in planning stages, will lead to an overwhelming
U.S. consensus that will demand a hasty exit from Iraq, no matter how
ignominious.  Our magnificent victory will strengthen our cause and create a
sanctuary in Iraq, chaos will increase in this important part of the world,
America’s credibility and values will be dealt a humiliating blow from which
the infidels will not recover for decades, and we will overthrow the corrupt
House of Saud and begin to reestablish the Caliphate.

Our successes so far have created complex and insuperable difficulties for
the Americans and their Iraqi lackeys.  We have increased the scope and
lethality of violence.  Our efforts to create chaos have gained an
unstoppable momentum.  From our initial de facto alliance with the Sunni
Baathist insurgency, we have spurred Shiite militias and death squads and
rampant criminality.  The Iraqi people voted in an election, but they feel
betrayed because they created a government in name only that cannot deliver
basic security or essential services.  Pessimism among the Americans and
their Iraqi supporters is pervasive.  As a result, chaos and sectarian
violence have grown and prospects for national reconciliation have vanished.

As the situation continues to brighten, our prospects are outstanding. A
slide toward chaos will trigger the collapse of Iraq’s government and a
catastrophe for infidels of every stripe.  Sunni-Shia clashes will spread. 
Not only will neighboring countries intervene, but we will be able to
undermine the corrupt rulers of Saudi Arabia and Jordan directly, and of
Egypt indirectly. We will win an even larger propaganda victory and expand
our base of operations. The global standing of the United States will be
diminished even more than it has been to date. Americans will not become
more polarized.  Instead, their defeat in Iraq, following upon their defeat
in Vietnam, will unify them in a determination to avoid military
interventions around the world, and especially in the Middle East.  As a
result, no nation in the Middle East will risk depending on any U.S.
security guarantees for decades to come.  In that large window of
opportunity, the rulers of these nations will face public hostility,
rebellions, and revolutions, all of which we will abet, and they will soon
be forced to flee for their lives.

During the past nine months we have considered a full range of approaches
for moving forward. Each will improve the prospect for success of the
others.  We firmly believe that it includes the best strategies and tactics
to positively influence the outcome in Iraq and the region. 

-- External approach  --

Iraq’s neighbors greatly affect Iraq’s stability.  Iran will benefit greatly
from a chaotic Iraq and a U.S. defeat, as Iran would become the dominant
power in the Middle East and would be able to proceed in its nuclear and
regional ambitions; Saudia Arabia, the Gulf states, Jordan, and Egypt will
be mortally wounded by a chaotic Iraq, yet are too short-sighted, weak, and
timid to act before it is too late.  Syria will benefit from a U.S.
withdrawal from Iraq and the Middle East because that would reduce any U.S.
military threat to Syria and would open a land route from Iran through Iraq
to Syria and Hezbollah.  With Hezbollah strengthened, Syria could reassert
its influence in Lebanon.  We feel that America has misjudged if it thinks
that a disintegration of Iraq will lead to conflict between Iran and Syria. 
They are allies, and have different spheres of influence in Iraq.  Moreover,
Syria is not challenging Iran to be regional hegemon.

The United States is considering a new diplomatic offensive to build an
international consensus for stability in Iraq  and the region, but this is
doomed to failure because it is apparent to all that America will withdraw
in short order.  Americans may call it redeployment, strategic
repositioning, or whatever they want, but everyone in the Middle East
recognizes weakness and defeat for what they are, and will respond
accordingly to protect their own interests as best they can without
depending on the United States.  States outside the region, notably in
Europe, will be harmed by a chaotic Iraq, but they have opposed the war from
the beginning and are not about to send troops now.  They would rather see
the U.S. effort collapse than take action to further their own
self-interest.  Thus there is no way that Iraq’s neighbors and key states in
and out of the region will form a support group to reinforce security and
national reconciliation within Iraq.  Since there will be no support group,
and since Iraq cannot achieve security and national reconciliation on its
own, Iraq — which was always a creation of the West — will come apart at the
seams.

America thinks that Iran should stem the flow of arms and training to Iraq,
respect Iraq’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and use its influence
over Iraqi Shia groups to encourage national reconciliation.  This is not
what Iran wants at all.  Iran is providing arms and training to Iraq in
order to influence Iraqi Shia groups to ally with Iran.  Iran wants a
fragmented Iraq, which will let it control a larger share of the world’s oil
supply and threaten Saudi Arabia, both of which will cause oil prices to
rise, giving the Iranians vastly more wealth.  Saudi Arabia, unable to
depend on U.S. armed forces for its defense, will cower in the face of Iran
and will buy “peace in our time” by going along with Iranian demands for
higher oil prices.  America hopes that the issue of Iran’s nuclear programs
will be dealt with by the five permanent members of the United Nations
Security Council, plus Germany, but we have seen how ineffectual the U.N.
has been, given Russia’s desire to have Iran as a customer and China’s
desire to have Iran as a supplier.  How very capitalistic!  America thinks
that Syria should control its border with Iraq to stem the flow of funding,
insurgents and terrorists in and out of Iraq, but America can’t even keep
millions of Mexicans out, so how can it expect Syria to do what it can’t do
— even if Syria wanted to.  America just does not “get it.”

Given the ability of Iran and Syria to influence events within Iraq and
their interest in promoting chaos in Iraq, any American attempt to engage
them constructively will fail. In large part, this is because the United
States has no disincentives available.  As Thomas Friedman says, pain is the
currency of the Middle East.  The imminent U.S. defeat removes U.S. ability
to inflict pain.

The United States cannot achieve its goals in the Middle East.  Some in
America think it can influence events in Iraq by dealing directly with the
Arab-Israeli conflict and launching a renewed and sustained commitment by
the United States to a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace on all fronts.  This
is nonsense.  Israel makes up less than one percent of the population and
territory of the Middle East   But this is a nonsense that serves our
interests.  The Israeli conflict with Lebanon and Palestine provide us with
recruits and propaganda, and diverts America’s attention and energy that
might otherwise be used elsewhere in the Middle East.

One place these resources might be used is Afghanistan, but the Taliban have
turned the tide, NATO is tiring of the mission, and the withdrawal of U.S.
forces from Afghanistan will make Afghans fearful of siding with NATO.  As
in Iraq, once things go south for the West, they quickly become
irreversible.

 --  Internal Approach  --

Americans say that the most important questions about Iraq’s future are now
the responsibility of Iraqis, and that the United States must adjust its
role in Iraq to encourage the Iraqi people to take control of their own
destiny.  This is simply a way of saying that America no longer has the will
or stomach to prevail.  Any nation that has lost the will to win is bound to
lose.  America’s defeat is just around the corner.

The Americans recommend that the Iraqi government should accelerate assuming
responsibility for Iraqi security by increasing the number and quality of
Iraqi Army brigades.  They are delusional.  While the Iraqi Army is the
least ineffective of the Iraqi security forces, it is not effective.  Few if
any units can fight on their own, and most won’t fight with U.S. assistance. 
Shiite units won’t go to Sunni areas, and vice versa — and for good reason. 
The United States doesn’t think highly enough of Iraqi Army soldiers to
provide them with proper equipment.  Soldiers return the favor by being away
for a week or more each month, and more if a battle looms.  And the Iraqi
police and Facilities Protection Service are so thoroughly infiltrated by
members of various militias that they are, from the Iraqi government’s
viewpoint, totally ineffective or worse.  It will make no difference if the
United States significantly increases the number of U.S. military personnel,
including combat troops, embedded in and supporting Iraqi Army units. 
Training is not indoctrination.  If the soldiers and police oppose the
Americans and sects other than their own, training simply provides them with
more skills to oppose the Americans and support their own sects, hastening
the day when U.S. soldiers are forced out of Iraq.  We appreciate whatever
training and supplies the United States provides to those who support our
work by increasing chaos.

Even if the primary mission of U.S. forces in Iraq evolves to one of
supporting the Iraqi Army, that army will be unable take over primary
responsibility for combat operations. By the first quarter of 2008, almost
all U.S. combat brigades will be out of Iraq.  While the ISG conditions the
withdrawal of some troops on unexpected developments in the security
situation on the ground, in reality it will be these “unexpected
developments,” or spectaculars as we prefer to call them, that will push
U.S. opinion to the point where it demands a pullout sans fig leaf.  We have
many “unexpected developments” in various stages of planning.

As one fig leaf, ISG suggests that U.S. combat forces in Iraq could be
deployed only in units embedded with Iraqi forces, in rapid-reaction and
special operations teams, and in training, equipping, advising, force
protection and search and rescue. Intelligence and support efforts would
continue. A vital mission of those rapid-reaction and special operations
forces would be to undertake strikes against al-Qaeda in Iraq.  This, again,
is delusional.  Everyone in Iraq, and indeed everyone around the world, will
know that this halfway, half-hearted approach is just a way station for a
total U.S. pullout and defeat.  Knowing this, Iraqi army soldiers will
recognize that a unified Iraq is a lost cause, so each soldier will fight
for his tribe or sect.  The fallacy of the “rapid” reaction approach was
well demonstrated by the U.S. response to our Thanksgiving Day Massacre.  We
killed 200 Shiites in a carefully-planned and well-coordinated series of
attacks, and it took over 2 hours for the “rapids” to react — even though
they were based in Baghdad itself.  Imagine how quickly they could react if
based in Kuwait or Anbar!  By the time they launched strikes against us, we
would be long gone, leaving them to kill noncombatants and make even more
enemies for America.  The American public would see through this fig leaf,
and would demand that the rapid reaction force not react.  The force would
become a farce.

The ISG recognizes that the Iraqi government will need assistance from the
United States for some time to come, especially in carrying out security
responsibilities. Yet the United States has made clear to Iraqis that it
will soon be forced to withdraw in utter humiliation even if the Iraqi
government implements the changes the United States wants it to undertake
(which of course the Iraqi government will be unable to do).  As a result,
fewer Iraqis will join the Iraqi Army, fewer of its soldiers will fight, and
any remaining power that the Iraqi government has will disintegrate.

As America retreats in defeat, its military leaders will no doubt emphasize
training and education of forces that have returned to the United States in
order to restore the force and its equipment to full combat capability.  But
as with Vietnam, the American armed forces will learn the wrong lessons and
buy the wrong equipment.  Vietnam, followed by Iraq, will expunge any
support by the American public for many decades for wars by any name — wars
of choice, wars of national liberation, counterinsurgency operations, or
just plain war.

The United States is deluding itself to think that Iraq’s leaders can
achieve specific objectives — or milestones — on national reconciliation,
security and governance. Miracles cannot be expected and will not happen. 
The people of Iraq had the right to expect action and progress.  But since
this has not happened in 45 months, the Iraqi government has demonstrated to
its own citizens — and the citizens of the United States and other countries
— that it no longer deserves continued support, and in fact that it never
did.

Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, in consultation with the United States, has
put forward a set of milestones critical for Iraq. This is a classic case of
the puppet saying what the puppeteer wants it to say, even though both know
that the puppet cannot do what the puppeteer wants it to do.  The puppet’s
list sounds noble, but neither words nor actions will enable it to succeed. 
The ISG urges President Bush and his national security team to remain in
close and frequent contact with the Iraqi leadership to convey a clear
message: there must be prompt action by the Iraqi government to take
substantial progress toward the achievement of these milestones.  But if
President Bush and his national security team were in even occasional
contact with reality, they would realize that the Iraqi government cannot
even slow the steady progression toward chaos.

If the Iraqi government demonstrates political will and makes substantial
progress toward the achievement of milestones on national reconciliation,
security and governance, the United States says that it would make clear its
willingness to continue training, assistance and support for Iraq’s security
forces and to continue political, military and economic support.  But the
United States is over a barrel of our making.  The Iraqi government will be
able to accomplish none of the goals its masters have set out, leaving the
United States in a position of supporting the Iraqi government despite its
failure — in which case puppet becomes puppeteer — or following through on
its threat and pulling out, blaming the puppet for the mistakes of the
puppeteer.  That fig leaf will be transparent to all.

The ISG’s recommendations in several other areas, such as improvements to
the Iraqi criminal justice system, the Iraqi oil sector, and the U.S.
reconstruction efforts in Iraq, are all, as we say, rearranging the deck
chairs on the observation deck of the World Trade Center.  Improvements to
the U.S. budget process, the training of U.S. government personnel and U.S.
intelligence capabilities will take years to implement, by which time the
war will be long over.  Like everything else the United States has done in
Iraq, will be too little, too late.

 

--  Conclusion  --

It is the unanimous view of the al-Qaeda in Iraq Study Group that, because
of our tactics and strategy, America has no viable options to stay in Iraq. 
Let us examine five options that President Bush is said to be considering,
and see why they all fail:

•                     “Go big,” or pour in many troops, perhaps hundreds of
thousands.  But U.S. public opinion strongly opposes this course, America
does not have these troops in the short run, and by the time they could be
created the war will be over.

•                     “Go long,” or stay in Iraq for many years with a small
force.  If 140,000 troops cannot win in nearly four years, how can far fewer
troops win in, say, eight years?  U.S. public opinion would oppose this
course as sacrificing American troops for nothing.

•                     “Surge,” or deploy perhaps 20,000 additional troops to
Baghdad to stabilize the situation, then withdraw them.  But we could simply
lay low for awhile in Baghdad and launch attacks elsewhere in Iraq. 
Alternatively, we could attack the American troops in Baghdad, who would be
like sitting ducks in a shooting gallery.

•                     “Hunt al-Qaeda,” or focus the U.S. military effort on
attacking our fighters.  But any aggressive U.S. strategy will expose more
U.S. soldiers to car bombs, house bombs, IEDs, small-arms fire, and
ambushes.  The U.S. public will not stand for these casualties.  In
addition, an Americans focus on us will give other insurgent groups a freer
hand in their activities.

•                     “Support the Shia,” or abandon Sunnis to their fate. 
This will bring on the wrath of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Jordan.  None of
these nations is at all likely to intervene in Iraq.  In particular, Saudi
Arabia’s failure to intervene would be a sign of weakness that would further
undermine any shred of legitimacy of the House of Saud.

With no viable options for staying in Iraq, with the Iraqi government
collapsing, and with the American public tiring of the daily casualties,
America will have no choice but to withdraw, leaving Iraq and the region in
chaos.

This will open the way for the next stages of our strategy.  To
recapitulate:

•                    We will continue our campaign of chaos.

•                     We will force America to leave Iraq and the Middle
East in a humiliating defeat.

•                     The American defeat will make any threats of U.S.
military intervention in the Middle East non-credible for decades to come.

•                     With the American defeat, the so-called Iraqi
government will fall like a rotten pomegranite, leaving chaos in its wake.

•                     An Iraq in chaos will give us a sanctuary in the heart
of the Middle East.

•                     From this sanctuary, we will launch attacks on Saudi
Arabia, Jordan, and others.

•                     The expulsion of the United States from the region — a
fitting coda to the Muslim expulsion from Spain in 1492 — will leave the
corrupt Saudi rulers at the mercy of Iran, whose influence will grow through
its close links with the Shia in southern Iraq.

•                     Saudi Arabia will be forced to go along with Iran’s
calls for it to drastically reduce its oil exports.

•                     This action, combined with the prospect of further
chaos in the region, will double or triple the price of oil, forcing the
West into a depression.

•                     The increase in Iranian oil revenues will give Iran
still more power to pursue its nuclear ambitions and to secure the support
of its people.  The scarcity of oil will make China even less willing to go
against Iran; the increase of Iranian petrodollars will make Russia even
less willing to go against Iran.

•                     The weakness of the Saudi government; pressure from
Iran, Saudi Shiites, Saudi Wahabbis, al-Qaeda, and others; and Saudi
realization that the United States will not come to its rescue, will force
the Saudi monarchy to flee for their lives.

•                     With Arabia no longer Saudi, it will be a simple
matter to cut back or cut off Arabian oil exports, and incidentally those of
the small Persian Gulf states, further deepening the West’s depression.

•                     An Iranian atomic bomb could lead Egypt to develop its
own atomic bomb.

•                     With Islam resurgent, it will be only a matter of time
before an Islamic bomb, whether from Iran, Pakistan, or Egypt, or stolen
from Russia or bought from a Russian criminal gang, winds up in Tel Aviv,
Washington, New York, or London.

•                     Victory will be ours!

These steps form a strategy that needs to be implemented in a coordinated,
sequential fashion, something that we have so far shown ourselves well able
to do.  Our successes in Iraq have set the stage for broader, and much more
important, successes in the region and the world.

The prospects are dazzling.  There will be many glorious days ahead.  By
continuing to pursue our present way forward, al-Qaeda will emerge stronger
and the corrupt infidel governments of the United States and the region will
be immeasurably weaker.

-- 
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