[Rhodes22-list] Reply to Wally about Iraq Information (political)
Tootle
ekroposki at charter.net
Wed Jul 11 14:07:57 EDT 2007
Wally said, “Now Iran and Iraq seem to be unified in hating us.” Wally our
new media is agenda driven and the way and which news they report has to
agree with their anti Bush agenda.
The people in control in Iran, both the political and religious try their
best to make what you say appear true. However, I ask you to produce
independent data to prove that part of your assertion specifically relating
to the general population.
There are also groups in Iraq who are against us. Specifically, it is those
groups who lost power or who want unilateral control. There is more than
one group, but Al Qaeda is the best known.
If you read the New York Times editorial that a reference was posted to on
this forum, it said, “The political leaders Washington has backed are
incapable of putting national interests ahead of sectarian score settling.
The security forces Washington has trained behave more like partisan
militias. Additional military forces poured into the Baghdad region have
failed to change anything.” That is the New York Times agenda driven
opinion. The opinion is blatantly anti American.
If you look at other information sources you can find other opinions. Since
you appear to accept there type opinion without challenge, there is nothing
to be said. Other sources of information do not agree with your opinion.
As a youngster I was chastised in Religion class for asking hard question of
those who asserted that they spoke the truth. When I still ask the hard
questions on demonstrating the facts on which the ‘alleged truth’ is based,
I can say the New York Times editorial is not accurate. Furthermore, it is
agenda driven. Learn not accept the national news media on the accuracy of
what they report.
Militant Islamists which includes Al Qaeda are a ruthless bunch, but do not
necessary include a majority of people in Islamic countries. They simply
kill anyone who has another opinion. The majority of people in those
counties do not have the skills, equipment or strategies to deal with them.
How does leaving that type in control make the world better for the U.S?
Ask some of these questions: If we leave Iraq who will gain control? Will
the U. S. be better off 10 years or so if those groups gain control?
Ed K
Greenville, SC, USA
Addendum: Lengthy commentary:
This 'other side of the hill' report on the ISG was written from the
al-Qaeda
viewpoint .............interesting perspective
_______________________________________________________________________________________________
Every war has winners and losers. The Iraq Study Group (ISG) report is
written
from the perspective of the latter. It shows how the United States, by
playing
an overwhelmingly strong hand with breathtaking ineptitude, has foreclosed
all
options leading to victory, even if victory is down-defined to mean simply a
stable Iraq. With no path to success, defeat and a rapid U.S. pullout are
inevitable.
The following report is a paragraph-by-paragraph mirror-image of the ISG
report
written from the perspective of the winners, specifically al-Qaeda. It is
more
realistic than the ISG report because it shows the many near- and
intermediate-term options opening to the winners. It shows that al-Qaeda,
Baathists, Sunni insurgents, and “dead-enders,” through a campaign of
terror,
have been able to sow chaos in Iraq, make the chaos self-amplifying, and
render
the “government” of “Iraq” powerless. More importantly, it shows how
turning
Iraq into a failed state can open the way to meeting critical goals of
al-Qaeda:
defeating the United States, nullifying the credibility of the United States
in
the Middle East and much of the rest of the world, spurring turmoil
throughout
the Middle East, weakening and then toppling governments in Saudi Arabia,
the
smaller Gulf states, Jordan, and Egypt, devastating Western economies, and
perhaps leading to a nuclear strike against Israel or the United States.
Why write from the perspective of al-Qaeda, which makes up a tiny fraction
of
the forces of chaos? Because al-Qaeda, from the beginning, has had the
broadest
strategic view of any of the players and because it, in coordination (or at
least in parallel) with other Sunni insurgents, is pursuing these goals
successfully. Its campaign of terror has proven to be the tactic that,
ruthlessly pursued, has placed it on the path to reach many strategic
objectives. Would that the United States had been as able to have
successful
tactics, a successful strategy, and the intelligence (in the sense of
brainpower) to link the one to the other!
Al-Qaeda in Iraq Study Group Report: Executive Summary
The situation in Iraq is proceeding far better, and far faster, than we had
dared hope, and prospects for us to achieve our goals are improving at a
quickening pace. We have many paths to many victories. Victory will build
on
victory, and we see new vistas of opportunity unfolding before our eyes
every
day.
In this report, we make a number of recommendations for actions to be taken
in
Iraq and the region. Actions to be taken against the United States will be
the
subject of a later report, but our victory in Iraq and the region will help
us
in these future actions. Our most important recommendation calls for
creating
more chaos in Iraq in order to undermine the pathetic “government” of Iraq
(which cannot govern even the Green Zone) and public opinion in the United
States. Undermining U.S. opinion and the Iraqi “government” are inseparable
and
mutually reinforcing. As U.S. support for the war collapses, ordinary
Iraqis
and members of the Iraqi government alike will be forced to turn to their
sects
for protection. This will deprive the government of any support and break
Iraq
apart, making the government collapse. And as the government collapses, U.S.
citizens will see that there is no “Iraq” to defend, so their support for
the
war will collapse. In fact, U.S. opinion has turned decisively against the
war,
and a few spectacular attacks, now in planning stages, will lead to an
overwhelming U.S. consensus that will demand a hasty exit from Iraq, no
matter
how ignominious. Our magnificent victory will strengthen our cause and
create a
sanctuary in Iraq, chaos will increase in this important part of the world,
America’s credibility and values will be dealt a humiliating blow from which
the
infidels will not recover for decades, and we will overthrow the corrupt
House
of Saud and begin to reestablish the Caliphate.
Our successes so far have created complex and insuperable difficulties for
the
Americans and their Iraqi lackeys. We have increased the scope and
lethality of
violence. Our efforts to create chaos have gained an unstoppable momentum.
>From our initial de facto alliance with the Sunni Baathist insurgency, we
have
spurred Shiite militias and death squads and rampant criminality. The Iraqi
people voted in an election, but they feel betrayed because they created a
government in name only that cannot deliver basic security or essential
services. Pessimism among the Americans and their Iraqi supporters is
pervasive. As a result, chaos and sectarian violence have grown and
prospects
for national reconciliation have vanished.
As the situation continues to brighten, our prospects are outstanding. A
slide
toward chaos will trigger the collapse of Iraq’s government and a
catastrophe
for infidels of every stripe. Sunni-Shia clashes will spread. Not only
will
neighboring countries intervene, but we will be able to undermine the
corrupt
rulers of Saudi Arabia and Jordan directly, and of Egypt indirectly. We will
win
an even larger propaganda victory and expand our base of operations. The
global
standing of the United States will be diminished even more than it has been
to
date. Americans will not become more polarized. Instead, their defeat in
Iraq,
following upon their defeat in Vietnam, will unify them in a determination
to
avoid military interventions around the world, and especially in the Middle
East. As a result, no nation in the Middle East will risk depending on any
U.S.
security guarantees for decades to come. In that large window of
opportunity,
the rulers of these nations will face public hostility, rebellions, and
revolutions, all of which we will abet, and they will soon be forced to flee
for
their lives.
During the past nine months we have considered a full range of approaches
for
moving forward. Each will improve the prospect for success of the others.
We
firmly believe that it includes the best strategies and tactics to
positively
influence the outcome in Iraq and the region.
External approach
Iraq’s neighbors greatly affect Iraq’s stability. Iran will benefit greatly
from a chaotic Iraq and a U.S. defeat, as Iran would become the dominant
power
in the Middle East and would be able to proceed in its nuclear and regional
ambitions; Saudia Arabia, the Gulf states, Jordan, and Egypt will be
mortally
wounded by a chaotic Iraq, yet are too short-sighted, weak, and timid to act
before it is too late. Syria will benefit from a U.S. withdrawal from Iraq
and
the Middle East because that would reduce any U.S. military threat to Syria
and
would open a land route from Iran through Iraq to Syria and Hezbollah. With
Hezbollah strengthened, Syria could reassert its influence in Lebanon. We
feel
that America has misjudged if it thinks that a disintegration of Iraq will
lead
to conflict between Iran and Syria. They are allies, and have different
spheres
of influence in Iraq. Moreover, Syria is not challenging Iran to be
regional
hegemon.
The United States is considering a new diplomatic offensive to build an
international consensus for stability in Iraq and the region, but this is
doomed to failure because it is apparent to all that America will withdraw
in
short order. Americans may call it redeployment, strategic repositioning,
or
whatever they want, but everyone in the Middle East recognizes weakness and
defeat for what they are, and will respond accordingly to protect their own
interests as best they can without depending on the United States. States
outside the region, notably in Europe, will be harmed by a chaotic Iraq, but
they have opposed the war from the beginning and are not about to send
troops
now. They would rather see the U.S. effort collapse than take action to
further
their own self-interest. Thus there is no way that Iraq’s neighbors and key
states in and out of the region will form a support group to reinforce
security
and national reconciliation within Iraq. Since there will be no support
group,
and since Iraq cannot achieve security and national reconciliation on its
own,
Iraq — which was always a creation of the West — will come apart at the
seams.
America thinks that Iran should stem the flow of arms and training to Iraq,
respect Iraq’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and use its influence
over
Iraqi Shia groups to encourage national reconciliation. This is not what
Iran
wants at all. Iran is providing arms and training to Iraq in order to
influence
Iraqi Shia groups to ally with Iran. Iran wants a fragmented Iraq, which
will
let it control a larger share of the world’s oil supply and threaten Saudi
Arabia, both of which will cause oil prices to rise, giving the Iranians
vastly
more wealth. Saudi Arabia, unable to depend on U.S. armed forces for its
defense, will cower in the face of Iran and will buy “peace in our time” by
going along with Iranian demands for higher oil prices. America hopes that
the
issue of Iran’s nuclear programs will be dealt with by the five permanent
members of the United Nations Security Council, plus Germany, but we have
seen
how ineffectual the U.N. has been, given Russia’s desire to have Iran as a
customer and China’s desire to have Iran as a supplier. How very
capitalistic!
America thinks that Syria should control its border with Iraq to stem the
flow
of funding, insurgents and terrorists in and out of Iraq, but America can’t
even
keep millions of Mexicans out, so how can it expect Syria to do what it
can’t do
— even if Syria wanted to. America just does not “get it.”
Given the ability of Iran and Syria to influence events within Iraq and
their
interest in promoting chaos in Iraq, any American attempt to engage them
constructively will fail. In large part, this is because the United States
has
no disincentives available. As Thomas Friedman says, pain is the currency
of
the Middle East. The imminent U.S. defeat removes U.S. ability to inflict
pain.
The United States cannot achieve its goals in the Middle East. Some in
America
think it can influence events in Iraq by dealing directly with the
Arab-Israeli
conflict and launching a renewed and sustained commitment by the United
States
to a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace on all fronts. This is nonsense.
Israel
makes up less than one percent of the population and territory of the Middle
East But this is a nonsense that serves our interests. The Israeli
conflict
with Lebanon and Palestine provide us with recruits and propaganda, and
diverts
America’s attention and energy that might otherwise be used elsewhere in the
Middle East.
One place these resources might be used is Afghanistan, but the Taliban have
turned the tide, NATO is tiring of the mission, and the withdrawal of U.S.
forces from Afghanistan will make Afghans fearful of siding with NATO. As
in
Iraq, once things go south for the West, they quickly become irreversible.
Internal Approach
Americans say that the most important questions about Iraq’s future are now
the
responsibility of Iraqis, and that the United States must adjust its role in
Iraq to encourage the Iraqi people to take control of their own destiny.
This
is simply a way of saying that America no longer has the will or stomach to
prevail. Any nation that has lost the will to win is bound to lose.
America’s
defeat is just around the corner.
The Americans recommend that the Iraqi government should accelerate assuming
responsibility for Iraqi security by increasing the number and quality of
Iraqi
Army brigades. They are delusional. While the Iraqi Army is the least
ineffective of the Iraqi security forces, it is not effective. Few if any
units
can fight on their own, and most won’t fight with U.S. assistance. Shiite
units
won’t go to Sunni areas, and vice versa — and for good reason. The United
States doesn’t think highly enough of Iraqi Army soldiers to provide them
with
proper equipment. Soldiers return the favor by being away for a week or
more
each month, and more if a battle looms. And the Iraqi police and Facilities
Protection Service are so thoroughly infiltrated by members of various
militias
that they are, from the Iraqi government’s viewpoint, totally ineffective or
worse. It will make no difference if the United States significantly
increases
the number of U.S. military personnel, including combat troops, embedded in
and
supporting Iraqi Army units. Training is not indoctrination. If the
soldiers
and police oppose the Americans and sects other than their own, training
simply
provides them with more skills to oppose the Americans and support their own
sects, hastening the day when U.S. soldiers are forced out of Iraq. We
appreciate whatever training and supplies the United States provides to
those
who support our work by increasing chaos.
Even if the primary mission of U.S. forces in Iraq evolves to one of
supporting
the Iraqi Army, that army will be unable take over primary responsibility
for
combat operations. By the first quarter of 2008, almost all U.S. combat
brigades
will be out of Iraq. While the ISG conditions the withdrawal of some troops
on
unexpected developments in the security situation on the ground, in reality
it
will be these “unexpected developments,” or spectaculars as we prefer to
call
them, that will push U.S. opinion to the point where it demands a pullout
sans
fig leaf. We have many “unexpected developments” in various stages of
planning.
As one fig leaf, ISG suggests that U.S. combat forces in Iraq could be
deployed
only in units embedded with Iraqi forces, in rapid-reaction and special
operations teams, and in training, equipping, advising, force protection and
search and rescue. Intelligence and support efforts would continue. A vital
mission of those rapid-reaction and special operations forces would be to
undertake strikes against al-Qaeda in Iraq. This, again, is delusional.
Everyone in Iraq, and indeed everyone around the world, will know that this
halfway, half-hearted approach is just a way station for a total U.S.
pullout
and defeat. Knowing this, Iraqi army soldiers will recognize that a unified
Iraq is a lost cause, so each soldier will fight for his tribe or sect. The
fallacy of the “rapid” reaction approach was well demonstrated by the U.S.
response to our Thanksgiving Day Massacre. We killed 200 Shiites in a
carefully-planned and well-coordinated series of attacks, and it took over 2
hours for the “rapids” to react — even though they were based in Baghdad
itself.
Imagine how quickly they could react if based in Kuwait or Anbar! By the
time
they launched strikes against us, we would be long gone, leaving them to
kill
noncombatants and make even more enemies for America. The American public
would
see through this fig leaf, and would demand that the rapid reaction force
not
react. The force would become a farce.
The ISG recognizes that the Iraqi government will need assistance from the
United States for some time to come, especially in carrying out security
responsibilities. Yet the United States has made clear to Iraqis that it
will
soon be forced to withdraw in utter humiliation even if the Iraqi government
implements the changes the United States wants it to undertake (which of
course
the Iraqi government will be unable to do). As a result, fewer Iraqis will
join
the Iraqi Army, fewer of its soldiers will fight, and any remaining power
that
the Iraqi government has will disintegrate.
As America retreats in defeat, its military leaders will no doubt emphasize
training and education of forces that have returned to the United States in
order to restore the force and its equipment to full combat capability. But
as
with Vietnam, the American armed forces will learn the wrong lessons and buy
the
wrong equipment. Vietnam, followed by Iraq, will expunge any support by the
American public for many decades for wars by any name — wars of choice, wars
of
national liberation, counterinsurgency operations, or just plain war.
The United States is deluding itself to think that Iraq’s leaders can
achieve
specific objectives — or milestones — on national reconciliation, security
and
governance. Miracles cannot be expected and will not happen. The people of
Iraq
had the right to expect action and progress. But since this has not
happened in
45 months, the Iraqi government has demonstrated to its own citizens — and
the
citizens of the United States and other countries — that it no longer
deserves
continued support, and in fact that it never did.
Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, in consultation with the United States, has
put
forward a set of milestones critical for Iraq. This is a classic case of the
puppet saying what the puppeteer wants it to say, even though both know that
the
puppet cannot do what the puppeteer wants it to do. The puppet’s list
sounds
noble, but neither words nor actions will enable it to succeed. The ISG
urges
President Bush and his national security team to remain in close and
frequent
contact with the Iraqi leadership to convey a clear message: there must be
prompt action by the Iraqi government to take substantial progress toward
the
achievement of these milestones. But if President Bush and his national
security team were in even occasional contact with reality, they would
realize
that the Iraqi government cannot even slow the steady progression toward
chaos.
If the Iraqi government demonstrates political will and makes substantial
progress toward the achievement of milestones on national reconciliation,
security and governance, the United States says that it would make clear its
willingness to continue training, assistance and support for Iraq’s security
forces and to continue political, military and economic support. But the
United
States is over a barrel of our making. The Iraqi government will be able to
accomplish none of the goals its masters have set out, leaving the United
States
in a position of supporting the Iraqi government despite its failure — in
which
case puppet becomes puppeteer — or following through on its threat and
pulling
out, blaming the puppet for the mistakes of the puppeteer. That fig leaf
will
be transparent to all.
The ISG’s recommendations in several other areas, such as improvements to
the
Iraqi criminal justice system, the Iraqi oil sector, and the U.S.
reconstruction
efforts in Iraq, are all, as we say, rearranging the deck chairs on the
observation deck of the World Trade Center. Improvements to the U.S. budget
process, the training of U.S. government personnel and U.S. intelligence
capabilities will take years to implement, by which time the war will be
long
over. Like everything else the United States has done in Iraq, will be too
little, too late.
Conclusion
It is the unanimous view of the al-Qaeda in Iraq Study Group that, because
of
our tactics and strategy, America has no viable options to stay in Iraq.
Let us
examine five options that President Bush is said to be considering, and see
why
they all fail:
• “Go big,” or pour in many troops, perhaps hundreds of
thousands. But U.S. public opinion strongly opposes this course, America
does
not have these troops in the short run, and by the time they could be
created
the war will be over.
• “Go long,” or stay in Iraq for many years with a small
force. If 140,000 troops cannot win in nearly four years, how can far fewer
troops win in, say, eight years? U.S. public opinion would oppose this
course
as sacrificing American troops for nothing.
• “Surge,” or deploy perhaps 20,000 additional troops to
Baghdad to stabilize the situation, then withdraw them. But we could simply
lay
low for awhile in Baghdad and launch attacks elsewhere in Iraq.
Alternatively,
we could attack the American troops in Baghdad, who would be like sitting
ducks
in a shooting gallery.
• “Hunt al-Qaeda,” or focus the U.S. military effort on
attacking our fighters. But any aggressive U.S. strategy will expose more
U.S.
soldiers to car bombs, house bombs, IEDs, small-arms fire, and ambushes.
The
U.S. public will not stand for these casualties. In addition, an Americans
focus on us will give other insurgent groups a freer hand in their
activities.
• “Support the Shia,” or abandon Sunnis to their fate.
This
will bring on the wrath of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Jordan. None of these
nations is at all likely to intervene in Iraq. In particular, Saudi
Arabia’s
failure to intervene would be a sign of weakness that would further
undermine
any shred of legitimacy of the House of Saud.
With no viable options for staying in Iraq, with the Iraqi government
collapsing, and with the American public tiring of the daily casualties,
America
will have no choice but to withdraw, leaving Iraq and the region in chaos.
This will open the way for the next stages of our strategy. To
recapitulate:
• We will continue our campaign of chaos.
• We will force America to leave Iraq and the Middle
East in
a humiliating defeat.
• The American defeat will make any threats of U.S.
military
intervention in the Middle East non-credible for decades to come.
• With the American defeat, the so-called Iraqi
government
will fall like a rotten pomegranite, leaving chaos in its wake.
• An Iraq in chaos will give us a sanctuary in the heart
of
the Middle East.
• From this sanctuary, we will launch attacks on Saudi
Arabia, Jordan, and others.
• The expulsion of the United States from the region — a
fitting coda to the Muslim expulsion from Spain in 1492 — will leave the
corrupt
Saudi rulers at the mercy of Iran, whose influence will grow through its
close
links with the Shia in southern Iraq.
• Saudi Arabia will be forced to go along with Iran’s
calls
for it to drastically reduce its oil exports.
• This action, combined with the prospect of further
chaos
in the region, will double or triple the price of oil, forcing the West into
a
depression.
• The increase in Iranian oil revenues will give Iran
still
more power to pursue its nuclear ambitions and to secure the support of its
people. The scarcity of oil will make China even less willing to go against
Iran; the increase of Iranian petrodollars will make Russia even less
willing to
go against Iran.
• The weakness of the Saudi government; pressure from
Iran,
Saudi Shiites, Saudi Wahabbis, al-Qaeda, and others; and Saudi realization
that
the United States will not come to its rescue, will force the Saudi monarchy
to
flee for their lives.
• With Arabia no longer Saudi, it will be a simple
matter to
cut back or cut off Arabian oil exports, and incidentally those of the small
Persian Gulf states, further deepening the West’s depression.
• An Iranian atomic bomb could lead Egypt to develop its
own
atomic bomb.
• With Islam resurgent, it will be only a matter of time
before an Islamic bomb, whether from Iran, Pakistan, or Egypt, or stolen
from
Russia or bought from a Russian criminal gang, winds up in Tel Aviv,
Washington,
New York, or London.
• Victory will be ours!
These steps form a strategy that needs to be implemented in a coordinated,
sequential fashion, something that we have so far shown ourselves well able
to
do. Our successes in Iraq have set the stage for broader, and much more
important, successes in the region and the world.
The prospects are dazzling. There will be many glorious days ahead. By
continuing to pursue our present way forward, al-Qaeda will emerge stronger
and
the corrupt infidel governments of the United States and the region will be
immeasurably weaker.
--
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