[Rhodes22-list] Reply to Wally about Iraq Information (political)

[Herb Parsons]

That's funny. You say you're not going to give a political response, and
then do exactly that.

I really don't much care what Cheney said, I was addressing what YOU
said:

"You make assumptions about what people read but you post more errors
to this list than anyone. Do you still think VP is in Legislative
Branch?"

To which I simply posed some questions. I'll repeat them:

Doesn't the constitution dictate that the Vice President of the United
States also serves as president of the Senate?

Isn't the Senate the legislative branch?

They're really pretty simple questions...

Herb Parsons

S/V O'Jure
  1976 O'Day 25
  Lake Grapevine, N TX

S/V Reve de Papa
  1971 Coronado 35
  Lake Pontchartrain, Louisiana Coast

>>> "TN Rhodey" <tnrhodey at gmail.com> 7/12/2007 11:17 AM >>>
Herb, I will not give a political response. But the issue was that
Cheney
claimed to be in first in the Executive, then the legislative, and
then
none.

peace!

Wally

On 7/12/07, Herb Parsons <HParsons at parsonsys.com> wrote:
>
> Wally,
>
> I caught the tail end of part of the "vice president in the
legislative
> branch" when I started trying to catch up. I almost posed it then,
but
> didn't. Since I see that you seem to be all caught up in the "I'm
> smarter than you" personal attacks, I think this would be a good time
to
> throw a little powder on the fire.
>
> Doesn't the constitution dictate that the Vice President of the
United
> States also serves as president of the Senate?
> Isn't the Senate the legislative branch?
>
> If I'm not mistaken, presiding over the senate is his only
> constitutionally dictated job. The rest of the position is a waiting
> game (to see if something happens to the President), with whatever
> additional duties the President chooses to give him.
>
> Herb Parsons
>
> S/V O'Jure
>   1976 O'Day 25
>   Lake Grapevine, N TX
>
> S/V Reve de Papa
>   1971 Coronado 35
>   Lake Pontchartrain, Louisiana Coast
>
> >>> "TN Rhodey" <tnrhodey at gmail.com> 7/12/2007 7:53 AM >>>
> Ed, I don't read the NY Times but you must read some filtered
watered
> down
> news. You really don't seem to be caught up on the facts.....our
> Military is
> claiming that Iran is sending arms to Iraq.. How you missed this I
> will
> never know. This has been discussed in pretty much every form of
media.
> Do
> your own research this is common knowledge. I don't know if this
> support is
> from the government or private parties. I do agree that the Iranian
> people
> are not as radical as their leaders but the fact is Iran is aiding
> Iraq
> terrorists..It is also a fact that they used to hate each other.
Heck
> Iraq
> even used chemical warfare against Iran in the 80s..Hating us is
> indeed
> become a common bond.
>
> You make assumptions about what people read but you post more errors
to
> this
> list than anyone. Do you still think VP is in Legislative Branch?
Even
> Cheney realized the folly of that position and changed his mind.
>
> I think most realize that the general media has some sort of bias.
The
> facts
> are pretty obvious.....we are still in Iraq, the threat of world
wide
> terror
> has increased, we have spent billions while not strengthening our
> hand.
>
> Wally
>
>
>
>
>
> On 7/11/07, Tootle <ekroposki at charter.net > wrote:
> >
> >
> >
> > Wally said, "Now Iran and Iraq seem to be unified in hating us."
> Wally
> > our
> > new media is agenda driven and the way and which news they report
has
> to
> > agree with their anti Bush agenda.
> >
> > The people in control in Iran, both the political and religious
try
> their
> > best to make what you say appear true.  However, I ask you to
> produce
> > independent data to prove that part of your assertion specifically
> > relating
> > to the general population.
> >
> > There are also groups in Iraq who are against us.  Specifically,
it
> is
> > those
> > groups who lost power or who want unilateral control.  There is
more
> than
> > one group, but Al Qaeda is the best known.
> >
> > If you read the New York Times editorial that a reference was
posted
> to on
> > this forum, it said, "The political leaders Washington has backed
> are
> > incapable of putting national interests ahead of sectarian score
> settling.
> >
> > The security forces Washington has trained behave more like
partisan
> > militias. Additional military forces poured into the Baghdad
region
> have
> > failed to change anything."  That is the New York Times agenda
> driven
> > opinion.  The opinion is blatantly anti American.
> >
> > If you look at other information sources you can find other
> > opinions.  Since
> > you appear to accept there type opinion without challenge, there
is
> > nothing
> > to be said.  Other sources of information do not agree with your
> opinion.
> >
> > As a youngster I was chastised in Religion class for asking hard
> question
> > of
> > those who asserted that they spoke the truth.  When I still ask
the
> hard
> > questions on demonstrating the facts on which the 'alleged truth'
is
> > based,
> > I can say the New York Times editorial is not accurate. 
Furthermore,
> it
> > is
> > agenda driven.  Learn not accept the national news media on the
> accuracy
> > of
> > what they report.
> >
> > Militant Islamists which includes Al Qaeda are a ruthless bunch,
but
> do
> > not
> > necessary include a majority of people in Islamic countries.  They
> simply
> > kill anyone who has another opinion.  The majority of people in
> those
> > counties do not have the skills, equipment or strategies to deal
> with
> > them.
> > How does leaving that type in control make the world better for
the
> U.S?
> >
> > Ask some of these questions:  If we leave Iraq who will gain
> > control?  Will
> > the U. S. be better off 10 years or so if those groups gain
control?
> >
> > Ed K
> > Greenville, SC, USA
> > Addendum:  Lengthy commentary:
> >
> > This 'other side of the hill' report on the ISG was written from
the
> > al-Qaeda
> > viewpoint .............interesting perspective
> >
>
>
_______________________________________________________________________________________________
> >
> > Every war has winners and losers.  The Iraq Study Group (ISG)
report
> is
> > written
> > from the perspective of the latter.  It shows how the United
States,
> by
> > playing
> > an overwhelmingly strong hand with breathtaking ineptitude, has
> foreclosed
> >
> > all
> > options leading to victory, even if victory is down-defined to
mean
> simply
> > a
> > stable Iraq.  With no path to success, defeat and a rapid U.S.
> pullout are
> > inevitable.
> > The following report is a paragraph-by-paragraph mirror-image of
the
> ISG
> > report
> > written from the perspective of the winners, specifically
al-Qaeda.
> It is
> > more
> > realistic than the ISG report because it shows the many near- and
> > intermediate-term options opening to the winners.  It shows that
> al-Qaeda,
> >
> > Baathists, Sunni insurgents, and "dead-enders," through a campaign
> of
> > terror,
> > have been able to sow chaos in Iraq, make the chaos
self-amplifying,
> and
> > render
> > the "government" of "Iraq" powerless.  More importantly, it shows
> how
> > turning
> > Iraq into a failed state can open the way to meeting critical
goals
> of
> > al-Qaeda:
> > defeating the United States, nullifying the credibility of the
> United
> > States
> > in
> > the Middle East and much of the rest of the world, spurring
turmoil
> > throughout
> > the Middle East, weakening and then toppling governments in Saudi
> Arabia,
> > the
> > smaller Gulf states, Jordan, and Egypt, devastating Western
> economies, and
> > perhaps leading to a nuclear strike against Israel or the United
> States.
> > Why write from the perspective of al-Qaeda, which makes up a tiny
> fraction
> > of
> > the forces of chaos?  Because al-Qaeda, from the beginning, has
had
> the
> > broadest
> > strategic view of any of the players and because it, in
coordination
> (or
> > at
> > least in parallel) with other Sunni insurgents, is pursuing these
> goals
> > successfully.  Its campaign of terror has proven to be the tactic
> that,
> > ruthlessly pursued, has placed it on the path to reach many
> strategic
> > objectives.  Would that the United States had been as able to have
> > successful
> > tactics, a successful strategy, and the intelligence (in the sense
> of
> > brainpower) to link the one to the other!
> >
> > Al-Qaeda in Iraq Study Group Report:  Executive Summary
> > The situation in Iraq is proceeding far better, and far faster,
than
> we
> > had
> > dared hope, and prospects for us to achieve our goals are
improving
> at a
> > quickening pace.  We have many paths to many victories.  Victory
> will
> > build
> > on
> > victory, and we see new vistas of opportunity unfolding before our
> eyes
> > every
> > day.
> > In this report, we make a number of recommendations for actions to
> be
> > taken
> > in
> > Iraq and the region. Actions to be taken against the United States
> will be
> >
> > the
> > subject of a later report, but our victory in Iraq and the region
> will
> > help
> > us
> > in these future actions.  Our most important recommendation calls
> for
> > creating
> > more chaos in Iraq in order to undermine the pathetic "government"
of
> Iraq
> >
> > (which cannot govern even the Green Zone) and public opinion in
the
> United
> > States.  Undermining U.S. opinion and the Iraqi "government" are
> > inseparable
> > and
> > mutually reinforcing.  As U.S. support for the war collapses,
> ordinary
> > Iraqis
> > and members of the Iraqi government alike will be forced to turn
to
> their
> > sects
> > for protection.  This will deprive the government of any support
and
> break
> > Iraq
> > apart, making the government collapse. And as the government
> collapses,
> > U.S.
> > citizens will see that there is no "Iraq" to defend, so their
support
> for
> > the
> > war will collapse.  In fact, U.S. opinion has turned decisively
> against
> > the
> > war,
> > and a few spectacular attacks, now in planning stages, will lead
to
> an
> > overwhelming U.S. consensus that will demand a hasty exit from
Iraq,
> no
> > matter
> > how ignominious.  Our magnificent victory will strengthen our
cause
> and
> > create a
> > sanctuary in Iraq, chaos will increase in this important part of
the
> > world,
> > America's credibility and values will be dealt a humiliating blow
> from
> > which
> > the
> > infidels will not recover for decades, and we will overthrow the
> corrupt
> > House
> > of Saud and begin to reestablish the Caliphate.
> > Our successes so far have created complex and insuperable
> difficulties for
> > the
> > Americans and their Iraqi lackeys.  We have increased the scope
and
> > lethality of
> > violence.  Our efforts to create chaos have gained an unstoppable
> > momentum.
> > From our initial de facto alliance with the Sunni Baathist
> insurgency, we
> > have
> > spurred Shiite militias and death squads and rampant criminality.
> The
> > Iraqi
> > people voted in an election, but they feel betrayed because they
> created a
> >
> > government in name only that cannot deliver basic security or
> essential
> > services.  Pessimism among the Americans and their Iraqi
supporters
> is
> > pervasive.  As a result, chaos and sectarian violence have grown
and
> > prospects
> > for national reconciliation have vanished.
> > As the situation continues to brighten, our prospects are
> outstanding. A
> > slide
> > toward chaos will trigger the collapse of Iraq's government and a
> > catastrophe
> > for infidels of every stripe.  Sunni-Shia clashes will spread. 
Not
> only
> > will
> > neighboring countries intervene, but we will be able to undermine
> the
> > corrupt
> > rulers of Saudi Arabia and Jordan directly, and of Egypt
indirectly.
> We
> > will
> > win
> > an even larger propaganda victory and expand our base of
operations.
> The
> > global
> > standing of the United States will be diminished even more than it
> has
> > been
> > to
> > date. Americans will not become more polarized.  Instead, their
> defeat in
> > Iraq,
> > following upon their defeat in Vietnam, will unify them in a
> determination
> > to
> > avoid military interventions around the world, and especially in
the
> > Middle
> > East.  As a result, no nation in the Middle East will risk
depending
> on
> > any
> > U.S.
> > security guarantees for decades to come.  In that large window of
> > opportunity,
> > the rulers of these nations will face public hostility,
rebellions,
> and
> > revolutions, all of which we will abet, and they will soon be
forced
> to
> > flee
> > for
> > their lives.
> > During the past nine months we have considered a full range of
> approaches
> > for
> > moving forward. Each will improve the prospect for success of the
> others.
> > We
> > firmly believe that it includes the best strategies and tactics to
> > positively
> > influence the outcome in Iraq and the region.
> >
> > External approach
> > Iraq's neighbors greatly affect Iraq's stability.  Iran will
benefit
> > greatly
> > from a chaotic Iraq and a U.S. defeat, as Iran would become the
> dominant
> > power
> > in the Middle East and would be able to proceed in its nuclear and
> > regional
> > ambitions; Saudia Arabia, the Gulf states, Jordan, and Egypt will
be
> > mortally
> > wounded by a chaotic Iraq, yet are too short-sighted, weak, and
timid
> to
> > act
> > before it is too late.  Syria will benefit from a U.S. withdrawal
> from
> > Iraq
> > and
> > the Middle East because that would reduce any U.S. military threat
> to
> > Syria
> > and
> > would open a land route from Iran through Iraq to Syria and
> > Hezbollah.  With
> > Hezbollah strengthened, Syria could reassert its influence in
> Lebanon.  We
> > feel
> > that America has misjudged if it thinks that a disintegration of
Iraq
> will
> > lead
> > to conflict between Iran and Syria.  They are allies, and have
> different
> > spheres
> > of influence in Iraq.  Moreover, Syria is not challenging Iran to
be
> > regional
> > hegemon.
> > The United States is considering a new diplomatic offensive to
build
> an
> > international consensus for stability in Iraq  and the region, but
> this is
> >
> > doomed to failure because it is apparent to all that America will
> withdraw
> > in
> > short order.  Americans may call it redeployment, strategic
> repositioning,
> > or
> > whatever they want, but everyone in the Middle East recognizes
> weakness
> > and
> > defeat for what they are, and will respond accordingly to protect
> their
> > own
> > interests as best they can without depending on the United States.
> States
> > outside the region, notably in Europe, will be harmed by a chaotic
> Iraq,
> > but
> > they have opposed the war from the beginning and are not about to
> send
> > troops
> > now.  They would rather see the U.S. effort collapse than take
action
> to
> > further
> > their own self-interest.  Thus there is no way that Iraq's
neighbors
> and
> > key
> > states in and out of the region will form a support group to
> reinforce
> > security
> > and national reconciliation within Iraq.  Since there will be no
> support
> > group,
> > and since Iraq cannot achieve security and national reconciliation
on
> its
> > own,
> > Iraq â€" which was always a creation of the West â€" will come
apart
> at the
> > seams.
> > America thinks that Iran should stem the flow of arms and training
> to
> > Iraq,
> > respect Iraq's sovereignty and territorial integrity, and use its
> > influence
> > over
> > Iraqi Shia groups to encourage national reconciliation.  This is
not
> what
> > Iran
> > wants at all.  Iran is providing arms and training to Iraq in
order
> to
> > influence
> > Iraqi Shia groups to ally with Iran.  Iran wants a fragmented
Iraq,
> which
> > will
> > let it control a larger share of the world's oil supply and
threaten
> Saudi
> > Arabia, both of which will cause oil prices to rise, giving the
> Iranians
> > vastly
> > more wealth.  Saudi Arabia, unable to depend on U.S. armed forces
for
> its
> > defense, will cower in the face of Iran and will buy "peace in our
> time"
> > by
> > going along with Iranian demands for higher oil prices.  America
> hopes
> > that
> > the
> > issue of Iran's nuclear programs will be dealt with by the five
> permanent
> > members of the United Nations Security Council, plus Germany, but
we
> have
> > seen
> > how ineffectual the U.N. has been, given Russia's desire to have
Iran
> as a
> > customer and China's desire to have Iran as a supplier.  How very
> > capitalistic!
> > America thinks that Syria should control its border with Iraq to
stem
> the
> > flow
> > of funding, insurgents and terrorists in and out of Iraq, but
> America
> > can't
> > even
> > keep millions of Mexicans out, so how can it expect Syria to do
what
> it
> > can't do
> > â€" even if Syria wanted to.  America just does not "get it."
> > Given the ability of Iran and Syria to influence events within
Iraq
> and
> > their
> > interest in promoting chaos in Iraq, any American attempt to
engage
> them
> > constructively will fail. In large part, this is because the
United
> States
> > has
> > no disincentives available.  As Thomas Friedman says, pain is the
> currency
> > of
> > the Middle East.  The imminent U.S. defeat removes U.S. ability to
> inflict
> > pain.
> > The United States cannot achieve its goals in the Middle East. 
Some
> in
> > America
> > think it can influence events in Iraq by dealing directly with the
> > Arab-Israeli
> > conflict and launching a renewed and sustained commitment by the
> United
> > States
> > to a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace on all fronts.  This is
> nonsense.
> > Israel
> > makes up less than one percent of the population and territory of
> the
> > Middle
> > East   But this is a nonsense that serves our interests.  The
> Israeli
> > conflict
> > with Lebanon and Palestine provide us with recruits and
propaganda,
> and
> > diverts
> > America's attention and energy that might otherwise be used
elsewhere
> in
> > the
> > Middle East.
> > One place these resources might be used is Afghanistan, but the
> Taliban
> > have
> > turned the tide, NATO is tiring of the mission, and the withdrawal
of
> U.S.
> > forces from Afghanistan will make Afghans fearful of siding with
> NATO.  As
> > in
> > Iraq, once things go south for the West, they quickly become
> irreversible.
> >
> >
> > Internal Approach
> > Americans say that the most important questions about Iraq's
future
> are
> > now
> > the
> > responsibility of Iraqis, and that the United States must adjust
its
> role
> > in
> > Iraq to encourage the Iraqi people to take control of their own
> destiny.
> > This
> > is simply a way of saying that America no longer has the will or
> stomach
> > to
> > prevail.  Any nation that has lost the will to win is bound to
lose.
> > America's
> > defeat is just around the corner.
> > The Americans recommend that the Iraqi government should
accelerate
> > assuming
> > responsibility for Iraqi security by increasing the number and
> quality of
> > Iraqi
> > Army brigades.  They are delusional.  While the Iraqi Army is the
> least
> > ineffective of the Iraqi security forces, it is not effective. 
Few
> if any
> >
> > units
> > can fight on their own, and most won't fight with U.S. assistance.
> Shiite
> > units
> > won't go to Sunni areas, and vice versa â€" and for good reason. 
The
> United
> > States doesn't think highly enough of Iraqi Army soldiers to
provide
> them
> > with
> > proper equipment.  Soldiers return the favor by being away for a
week
> or
> > more
> > each month, and more if a battle looms.  And the Iraqi police and
> > Facilities
> > Protection Service are so thoroughly infiltrated by members of
> various
> > militias
> > that they are, from the Iraqi government's viewpoint, totally
> ineffective
> > or
> > worse.  It will make no difference if the United States
> significantly
> > increases
> > the number of U.S. military personnel, including combat troops,
> embedded
> > in
> > and
> > supporting Iraqi Army units.  Training is not indoctrination.  If
> the
> > soldiers
> > and police oppose the Americans and sects other than their own,
> training
> > simply
> > provides them with more skills to oppose the Americans and support
> their
> > own
> > sects, hastening the day when U.S. soldiers are forced out of
Iraq.
> We
> > appreciate whatever training and supplies the United States
provides
> to
> > those
> > who support our work by increasing chaos.
> > Even if the primary mission of U.S. forces in Iraq evolves to one
of
> > supporting
> > the Iraqi Army, that army will be unable take over primary
> responsibility
> > for
> > combat operations. By the first quarter of 2008, almost all U.S.
> combat
> > brigades
> > will be out of Iraq.  While the ISG conditions the withdrawal of
> some
> > troops
> > on
> > unexpected developments in the security situation on the ground,
in
> > reality
> > it
> > will be these "unexpected developments," or spectaculars as we
prefer
> to
> > call
> > them, that will push U.S. opinion to the point where it demands a
> pullout
> > sans
> > fig leaf.  We have many "unexpected developments" in various
stages
> of
> > planning.
> > As one fig leaf, ISG suggests that U.S . combat forces in Iraq
could
> be
> > deployed
> > only in units embedded with Iraqi forces, in rapid-reaction and
> special
> > operations teams, and in training, equipping, advising, force
> protection
> > and
> > search and rescue. Intelligence and support efforts would
continue.
> A
> > vital
> > mission of those rapid-reaction and special operations forces
would
> be to
> > undertake strikes against al-Qaeda in Iraq.  This, again, is
> delusional.
> > Everyone in Iraq, and indeed everyone around the world, will know
> that
> > this
> > halfway, half-hearted approach is just a way station for a total
> U.S.
> > pullout
> > and defeat.  Knowing this, Iraqi army soldiers will recognize that
a
> > unified
> > Iraq is a lost cause, so each soldier will fight for his tribe or
> > sect.  The
> > fallacy of the "rapid" reaction approach was well demonstrated by
the
> U.S.
> > response to our Thanksgiving Day Massacre.  We killed 200 Shiites
in
> a
> > carefully-planned and well-coordinated series of attacks, and it
took
> over
> > 2
> > hours for the "rapids" to react â€" even though they were based in
> Baghdad
> > itself.
> > Imagine how quickly they could react if based in Kuwait or Anbar! 
By
> the
> > time
> > they launched strikes against us, we would be long gone, leaving
them
> to
> > kill
> > noncombatants and make even more enemies for America.  The
American
> public
> > would
> > see through this fig leaf, and would demand that the rapid
reaction
> force
> > not
> > react.  The force would become a farce.
> > The ISG recognizes that the Iraqi government will need assistance
> from the
> > United States for some time to come, especially in carrying out
> security
> > responsibilities. Yet the United States has made clear to Iraqis
that
> it
> > will
> > soon be forced to withdraw in utter humiliation even if the Iraqi
> > government
> > implements the changes the United States wants it to undertake
(which
> of
> > course
> > the Iraqi government will be unable to do).  As a result, fewer
> Iraqis
> > will
> > join
> > the Iraqi Army, fewer of its soldiers will fight, and any
remaining
> power
> > that
> > the Iraqi government has will disintegrate.
> > As America retreats in defeat, its military leaders will no doubt
> > emphasize
> > training and education of forces that have returned to the United
> States
> > in
> > order to restore the force and its equipment to full combat
> > capability.  But
> > as
> > with Vietnam, the American armed forces will learn the wrong
lessons
> and
> > buy
> > the
> > wrong equipment.  Vietnam, followed by Iraq, will expunge any
support
> by
> > the
> > American public for many decades for wars by any name â€" wars of
> choice,
> > wars
> > of
> > national liberation, counterinsurgency operations, or just plain
> war.
> > The United States is deluding itself to think that Iraq's leaders
> can
> > achieve
> > specific objectives â€" or milestones â€" on national
reconciliation,
> security
> > and
> > governance. Miracles cannot be expected and will not happen.  The
> people
> > of
> > Iraq
> > had the right to expect action and progress.  But since this has
not
> > happened in
> > 45 months, the Iraqi government has demonstrated to its own
citizens
> â€" and
> > the
> > citizens of the United States and other countries â€" that it no
> longer
> > deserves
> > continued support, and in fact that it never did.
> > Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, in consultation with the United
> States, has
> > put
> > forward a set of milestones critical for Iraq. This is a classic
case
> of
> > the
> > puppet saying what the puppeteer wants it to say, even though both
> know
> > that
> > the
> > puppet cannot do what the puppeteer wants it to do.  The puppet's
> list
> > sounds
> > noble, but neither words nor actions will enable it to succeed. 
The
> ISG
> > urges
> > President Bush and his national security team to remain in close
and
> > frequent
> > contact with the Iraqi leadership to convey a clear message: there
> must be
> > prompt action by the Iraqi government to take substantial progress
> toward
> > the
> > achievement of these milestones.  But if President Bush and his
> national
> > security team were in even occasional contact with reality, they
> would
> > realize
> > that the Iraqi government cannot even slow the steady progression
> toward
> > chaos.
> > If the Iraqi government demonstrates political will and makes
> substantial
> > progress toward the achievement of milestones on national
> reconciliation,
> > security and governance, the United States says that it would make
> clear
> > its
> > willingness to continue training, assistance and support for
Iraq's
> > security
> > forces and to continue political, military and economic support. 
But
> the
> > United
> > States is over a barrel of our making.  The Iraqi government will
be
> able
> > to
> > accomplish none of the goals its masters have set out, leaving the
> United
> > States
> > in a position of supporting the Iraqi government despite its
failure
> â€" in
> > which
> > case puppet becomes puppeteer â€" or following through on its
threat
> and
> > pulling
> > out, blaming the puppet for the mistakes of the puppeteer.  That
fig
> leaf
> > will
> > be transparent to all.
> > The ISG's recommendations in several other areas, such as
> improvements to
> > the
> > Iraqi criminal justice system, the Iraqi oil sector, and the U.S.
> > reconstruction
> > efforts in Iraq, are all, as we say, rearranging the deck chairs
on
> the
> > observation deck of the World Trade Center.  Improvements to the
> U.S.
> > budget
> > process, the training of U.S. government personnel and U.S.
> intelligence
> > capabilities will take years to implement, by which time the war
will
> be
> > long
> > over.  Like everything else the United States has done in Iraq,
will
> be
> > too
> > little, too late.
> >
> > Conclusion
> > It is the unanimous view of the al-Qaeda in Iraq Study Group that,
> because
> > of
> > our tactics and strategy, America has no viable options to stay in
> Iraq.
> > Let us
> > examine five options that President Bush is said to be
considering,
> and
> > see
> > why
> > they all fail:
> >
> >
> > â—                      "Go big," or pour in many troops,
perhaps
> hundreds
> > of
> > thousands.  But U.S. public opinion strongly opposes this course,
> America
> > does
> > not have these troops in the short run, and by the time they could
> be
> > created
> > the war will be over.
> > â—                      "Go long," or stay in Iraq for many
years
> with a
> > small
> > force.  If 140,000 troops cannot win in nearly four years, how can
> far
> > fewer
> > troops win in, say, eight years?   U.S. public opinion would
oppose
> this
> > course
> > as sacrificing American troops for nothing.
> > â—                      "Surge," or deploy perhaps 20,000
additional
> troops
> > to
> > Baghdad to stabilize the situation, then withdraw them.  But we
> could
> > simply
> > lay
> > low for awhile in Baghdad and launch attacks elsewhere in Iraq.
> > Alternatively,
> > we could attack the American troops in Baghdad, who would be like
> sitting
> > ducks
> > in a shooting gallery.
> > â—                      "Hunt al-Qaeda," or focus the U.S.
military
> effort
> > on
> > attacking our fighters.  But any aggressive U.S. strategy will
expose
> more
> > U.S.
> > soldiers to car bombs, house bombs, IEDs, small-arms fire, and
> ambushes.
> > The
> > U.S. public will not stand for these casualties.  In addition, an
> > Americans
> > focus on us will give other insurgent groups a freer hand in their
> > activities.
> > â—                      "Support the Shia," or abandon Sunnis to
> their fate.
> > This
> > will bring on the wrath of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Jordan.  None
of
> these
> >
> > nations is at all likely to intervene in Iraq.  In particular,
Saudi
> > Arabia's
> > failure to intervene would be a sign of weakness that would
further
> > undermine
> > any shred of legitimacy of the House of Saud.
> > With no viable options for staying in Iraq, with the Iraqi
> government
> > collapsing, and with the American public tiring of the daily
> casualties,
> > America
> > will have no choice but to withdraw, leaving Iraq and the region
in
> chaos.
> >
> > This will open the way for the next stages of our strategy.  To
> > recapitulate:
> > â—                     We will continue our campaign of chaos.
> > â—                      We will force America to leave Iraq and
the
> Middle
> > East in
> > a humiliating defeat.
> > â—                      The American defeat will make any threats
of
> U.S.
> > military
> > intervention in the Middle East non-credible for decades to come.
> > â—                      With the American defeat, the so-called
> Iraqi
> > government
> > will fall like a rotten pomegranite, leaving chaos in its wake.
> > â—                      An Iraq in chaos will give us a sanctuary
in
> the
> > heart
> > of
> > the Middle East.
> > â—                      From this sanctuary, we will launch
attacks
> on Saudi
> >
> > Arabia, Jordan, and others.
> > â—                      The expulsion of the United States from
the
> region â€"
> > a
> > fitting coda to the Muslim expulsion from Spain in 1492 â€" will
> leave the
> > corrupt
> > Saudi rulers at the mercy of Iran, whose influence will grow
through
> its
> > close
> > links with the Shia in southern Iraq.
> > â—                      Saudi Arabia will be forced to go along
with
> Iran's
> > calls
> > for it to drastically reduce its oil exports.
> > â—                      This action, combined with the prospect
of
> further
> > chaos
> > in the region, will double or triple the price of oil, forcing the
> West
> > into
> > a
> > depression.
> > â—                      The increase in Iranian oil revenues
will
> give Iran
> > still
> > more power to pursue its nuclear ambitions and to secure the
support
> of
> > its
> > people.  The scarcity of oil will make China even less willing to
go
> > against
> > Iran; the increase of Iranian petrodollars will make Russia even
> less
> > willing to
> > go against Iran.
> > â—                      The weakness of the Saudi government;
> pressure from
> > Iran,
> > Saudi Shiites, Saudi Wahabbis, al-Qaeda, and others; and Saudi
> realization
> > that
> > the United States will not come to its rescue, will force the
Saudi
> > monarchy
> > to
> > flee for their lives.
> > â—                      With Arabia no longer Saudi, it will be
a
> simple
> > matter to
> > cut back or cut off Arabian oil exports, and incidentally those of
> the
> > small
> > Persian Gulf states, further deepening the West's depression.
> > â—                      An Iranian atomic bomb could lead Egypt
to
> develop
> > its
> > own
> > atomic bomb.
> > â—                      With Islam resurgent, it will be only a
> matter of
> > time
> > before an Islamic bomb, whether from Iran, Pakistan, or Egypt, or
> stolen
> > from
> > Russia or bought from a Russian criminal gang, winds up in Tel
Aviv,
> > Washington,
> > New York, or London.
> > â—                      Victory will be ours!
> > These steps form a strategy that needs to be implemented in a
> coordinated,
> > sequential fashion, something that we have so far shown ourselves
> well
> > able
> > to
> > do.  Our successes in Iraq have set the stage for broader, and
much
> more
> > important, successes in the region and the world.
> > The prospects are dazzling.  There will be many glorious days
ahead.
> By
> > continuing to pursue our present way forward, al-Qaeda will emerge
> > stronger
> > and
> > the corrupt infidel governments of the United States and the
region
> will
> > be
> > immeasurably weaker.
> >
> >
> >
> > --
> > View this message in context:
> > http://www.nabble.com/Iraq-Update-tf4048809.html#a11545715 
> > Sent from the Rhodes 22 mailing list archive at Nabble.com.
> >
> > __________________________________________________
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