[Rhodes22-list] AQ a Terror Threat?

[Brad Haslett]

Slim,

Just getting caught up on e-mails between spurts of useful activity.  Bush
didn't listen to a lot of advice, including Colin Powell's "Pottery Barn"
doctrine; " If you break it, you own it"'.  It is definitely now broken!
Our exit from Vietnam was easy compare to this situation.  Speaking of
which, I listen to bar talk here every day bitching about "gooks",
"niggers", and Mexicans.  I'm not that big and I don't want to demonstrate
my cockpit defense training skills on a daily basis, however, I find it
ironic listening to people bitching about  what the government isn't doing
to help them and at the same time, crying for a bigger government.  Our
little company specialize in Gooks!  They pay on time. If we  figure out how
to capitalize on our "Gookiness" we will!

Brad


On 6/28/07, Steven Alm <stevenalm at gmail.com> wrote:
>
> Brad,
>
> Bush wouldn't let Abizaid do his job and wouldn't take his advice even
> though he was Lebanese, spoke Arabic and knew the middle east culture
> well.
> Time will tell if Petraeus will succeed and if Bush will allow him to do
> his
> job.
>
> Slim
>
> On 6/28/07, Brad Haslett <flybrad at gmail.com> wrote:
> >
> > Slim,
> >
> > Great story!  I'm a little short on time this morning or I'd tell the
> > story
> > about a friend of mine who got arrested in uniform at the MEM airport
> > shortly after 9/11.  As he was being led away in cuffs the 'security'
> > person
> > scolded him, "bein' a pilot at de airport don' mean shit no
> mo'."  Richard
> > Reid, the shoe bomber, was delayed a day because the ticket agent, a
> > former
> > El Al employee, profiled him.  The French let him fly the next day and
> the
> > only reason he wasn't successful was that the ignitor for his shoe took
> on
> > too much moisture (it was raining in Paris that day).  The AQ threat is
> > still out there.  The flying Imans incident and the lawsuit that
> followed
> > in
> > your town was an attempt to use PC to open opportunities.  There are
> > smarter
> > ways to go about Homeland security but we'll have to overcome our PC
> > addiction and make more use of technology, biometrics at the passenger
> > terminal for one.
> >
> > Attached is Fred Kagan's latest on Iraq.  The press is giving little
> > coverage to current events and our 'leaders' in the Congress from the
> > great
> > nation of Incumbantstan are too busy watching the polls and their
> > re-election campaign fund to make any real analysis.
> >
> > Brad
> >
> >    Understanding General Petraeus's Strategy
> > Testimony to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs.
> > by Frederick W. Kagan
> > 06/27/2007 10:00:00 AM
> >
> >
> > *Testimony delivered by Frederick W. Kagan, resident scholar at the
> > American
> > Enterprise Institute, to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on
> > Wednesday, June 27, 2007.*
> >
> > American military forces in Iraq are now entering the second phase of
> > their
> > kinetic operations even as political efforts continue on a separate but
> > linked track. Ambassador Ryan Crocker and General David Petraeus are in
> > the
> > midst of a multi-faceted program that will not proceed in a linear way
> and
> > will not generate clear and consistent metrics in all of its phases. The
> > early signs are positive in a number of respects, although difficulties
> > and
> > challenges clearly remain. But it is too soon to evaluate the outcome of
> > an
> > operation that is just moving into the first of several phases intended
> to
> > produce significant positive change in the situation overall.
> >
> > It is now beyond question that the Bush Administration pursued a flawed
> > approach to the war in Iraq from 2003 to 2007. That approach relied on
> > keeping the American troop presence in Iraq as small as possible,
> pushing
> > unprepared Iraqi Security Forces into the lead too rapidly, and using
> > political progress as the principal means of bringing the violence under
> > control. In other words, it is an approach similar to the one proposed
> by
> > the ISG and by some who are now pushing for political benchmarks and the
> > rapid drawdown of American forces as the keys to success in the war. It
> is
> > no more likely to work now than it was then. Political progress is
> > something
> > that follows the establishment of security, not something that causes
> it.
> > The sorts of political compromises that Iraq's parties must make are
> > extraordinarily difficult--one might even say impossible--in the context
> > of
> > uncontrolled terrorism and sectarian violence. And the Iraqi Security
> > Forces, although significantly better than they were this time last
> year,
> > are still too small and insufficiently capable to *establish* security
> on
> > their own or even to maintain it in difficult and contested areas
> without
> > significant continuing coalition support.
> >
> > For all of these reasons, the president changed his strategy profoundly
> in
> > January 2007, and appointed a new commander in General Petraeus and a
> new
> > Ambassador in Ryan Crocker to oversee the new approach. This new
> approach
> > focuses on establishing security in Baghdad and its immediate environs
> as
> > the prerequisite for political progress. It recognizes that American
> > forces
> > must be in the lead in many (but not all) areas, and that they will have
> > to
> > remain in areas that have been cleared for some time in order to ensure
> > that
> > security becomes permanent. The aim of the security strategy is to buy
> > space
> > and time for the political process in Iraq to work, and for the Iraqi
> > Security Forces to mature and grow to the point where they can maintain
> > the
> > dramatically improved security situation our forces will have helped
> them
> > to
> > establish.
> >
> > The scale of the problem required an increase in American forces in
> Iraq,
> > which the president ordered in January, of around 40% (from the
> equivalent
> > of 15 brigade combat teams to more than 21). It also required a
> > multi-phased
> > approach on both the military and the political side of the equation,
> > which
> > has been begun.
> >
> > The first phase began on January 10th with the announcement of the new
> > strategy and the beginning of the movement of the 5 additional Army
> > brigades
> > and Marine elements into the theater. That deployment process was only
> > completed at the beginning of this month--in fact, critical enablers for
> > those combat forces are still arriving in theater. As the new units
> > entered
> > Iraq, the U.S. military commanders began pushing those that were already
> > in
> > the theater forward from their operating bases into Joint Security
> > Stations
> > and Combat Outposts in key neighborhoods in Baghdad and elsewhere. The
> > purpose of these movements was not to clear-and-hold--the units present
> in
> > theater were not sufficient in numbers to conduct such operations. The
> > purpose was instead to establish positions within those key areas and to
> > develop both intelligence about the enemy and trust relationships with
> the
> > local communities that would make possible decisive clear-and-hold
> > operations subsequently. During this phase of the operation, additional
> > Iraqi Security Forces deployed to Baghdad in accord with a plan
> developed
> > jointly by the U.S. and Iraqi military commands. All of the requested
> > units
> > appeared in the first Iraqi Army rotation, and the Iraqi military has
> just
> > completed its second rotation of units into Baghdad--again, all
> designated
> > units arrived, and their fill levels were generally higher than in the
> > first
> > rotation.
> >
> > Generals Petraeus and Odierno did not allocate the majority of the new
> > combat power they received to Baghdad. Only 2 of the additional Army
> > brigades went into the city. The other 3 Army brigades and the
> equivalent
> > of
> > a Marine regiment were deployed into the areas around Baghdad that our
> > generals call the "Baghdad belts," including Baqubah in Diyala province.
> > The
> > purpose of this deployment was not to clear-and-hold those areas, but to
> > make possible the second phase of the operation that began on June 15.
> The
> > purpose of this operation--Phantom Thunder--is to disrupt terrorist and
> > militia networks and bases outside of Baghdad that have been feeding the
> > violence within the city. Most of the car bomb and suicide bomb networks
> > that have been supporting the al Qaeda surge since January are based in
> > these belt areas, and American commanders have rightly recognized that
> > they
> > cannot establish stable security in the capital without disrupting these
> > networks and their bases.
> >
> > But even this operation--the largest coordinated combat operation the
> U.S.
> > has undertaken since the invasion in 2003--is not the decisive phase of
> > the
> > current strategy. It is an operation designed to set the preconditions
> for
> > a
> > successful clear-and-hold operation that will probably begin in late
> July
> > or
> > early August within Baghdad itself. That is the operation that is
> designed
> > to bring security to Iraq's capital in a lasting way that will create
> the
> > space for political progress that we all desire.
> >
> > The U.S. has not undertaken a multi-phased operation on such a large
> scale
> > since 2003, and it is not surprising therefore that many commentators
> have
> > become confused about how to evaluate what is going on and how to report
> > it.
> > Sectarian deaths in Baghdad dropped significantly as soon as the new
> > strategy was announced in January, and remain at less than half their
> > former
> > levels. Spectacular attacks rose as al Qaeda conducted a counter-surge
> of
> > its own, but have recently begun falling again. Violence is down
> > tremendously in Anbar province, where the Sunni tribes have turned
> against
> > al Qaeda and are actively cooperating with U.S. forces for the first
> time.
> > This process has spread from Anbar into Babil, Salah-ad-Din, and even
> > Diyala
> > provinces, and echoes of it have even spread into one of the worst
> > neighborhoods in Baghdad--Ameriyah, formerly an al Qaeda stronghold.
> > Violence has risen naturally in areas that the enemy had long controlled
> > but
> > in which U.S. forces are now actively fighting for the first time in
> many
> > years, and the downward spiral in Diyala that began in mid-2006
> continued
> > (which is not surprising, since the Baghdad Security Plan does not aim
> to
> > establish security in Diyala).
> >
> > All of these trends are positive. The growing skill and determination of
> > the
> > Iraqi Army units fighting alongside Americans is also positive. Some
> Iraqi
> > Police units have also fought well. Others have displayed sectarian
> > tendencies and participated in sectarian actions. Political progress has
> > been very slow--something that has clearly disappointed many who hoped
> for
> > an immediate turnaround, but that is not surprising for those who always
> > believed that it would follow, not precede or accompany, the
> establishment
> > of security at least in Baghdad. And negative sectarian actors within
> the
> > Iraqi Government continue to resist making necessary compromises with
> > former
> > foes. Overall, the basic trends are rather better than could have been
> > expected of the operation so far, primarily because of the unanticipated
> > stunning success in Anbar and its spread. But it remains far too early
> to
> > offer any meaningful evaluation of the progress of an operation whose
> > decisive phases are only just beginning.
> >
> > To say that the current plan has failed is simply incorrect. It might
> > fail,
> > of course, as any military/political plan might fail. Indications on the
> > military side strongly suggest that success--in the form of dramatically
> > reduced violence by the end of this year--is quite likely. Indications
> on
> > the political side are more mixed, but are also less meaningful at this
> > early stage before security has been established.
> >
> > Great commanders in history have understood two critical truths: the
> > situation in war is constantly changing, and decisions must take that
> > change
> > into account--and, therefore, that it is best to delay decisions until
> the
> > last possible moment to ensure that they are made on the basis of the
> most
> > recent and accurate understanding of the situation, rather than on
> > preconceptions formed in different circumstances. The situation in Iraq
> is
> > very different today from what it was in January 2007, to say nothing of
> > November 2006. It will be very different in September, and still more
> > different in December of this year. It would be a great error to attempt
> > to
> > decide now upon the strategy to pursue when the current plan has
> actually
> > been implemented, because we cannot now predict what the situation will
> be
> > then with any confidence or accuracy. And it would be a very grave error
> > indeed to rush now to abandon the first strategy that offers some real
> > prospect for success in favor of a return to an approach that has
> already
> > failed repeatedly.
> > *
> >
> > --Frederick W. Kagan
> > *
> >
> >
> > On 6/28/07, Steven Alm <stevenalm at gmail.com> wrote:
> > >
> > > I moved to MD in 1980 driving a 1969 Dodge van.  It had MN plates with
> > > expired stickers so I just tore the stickers off and planned to play
> > dumb
> > > if
> > > I got stopped.  And I did.  The cop said he thought MN required
> stickers
> > > and
> > > kinda scratched my head and said, "Dunno.  Never done it before."
> > >
> > > He went back to his cruiser for a few minutes and came back said his
> > > computer was broken down so he couldn't check.  So off I went on my
> > merry
> > > way.  Next I had to grease the palm of the guy at the inspection shop
> to
> > > get
> > > him to pass my old van held together with bailing wire and various
> > > jury-rigged light switches.
> > >
> > > Pardon the rambling but this was funny:  The break light switch under
> > the
> > > break pedal was shot and no longer available so I by-passed the old
> > switch
> > > and ran wires up the steering column and out onto the
> three-on-the-tree
> > > shift lever.  There I mounted a SPST momentary throw switch which
> turned
> > > on
> > > the break lights.  When stopping, I always had my hand on the shifter
> > > anyway
> > > so when I stepped on the breaks I also through the switch with my
> thumb.
> > > When the inspector asked what the switch was for I said it was for an
> > old
> > > horn that I don't have anymore.  I through the switch a few times
> while
> > he
> > > looked closely at it and didn't hear any horn.  When he walked around
> > > checking the lights, he called out, "Break Lights!"  I didn't even
> push
> > > the
> > > pedal, I just thumbed the switch and passed.
> > >
> > > I never did change my driver's license because I was only there for
> the
> > > school year.
> > >
> > > Slim
> > >
> > > On 6/27/07, Robert Skinner <robert at squirrelhaven.com> wrote:
> > > >
> > > > Mary Lou Troy wrote:
> > > > > What? you didn't bring the bill or piece of mail with your local
> > > > > address on it or was it some other frivolous bit of info? Because
> we
> > > > > have such a long drive to Easton, we brought lots of paper with us
> > > > > and I don't remember what I actually needed. I do remember that
> with
> > > > > the vehicles it cost me a lot more than in PA.
> > > > -----------------------------------------------------
> > > > I also migrated from PA to MD about 20 years ago,
> > > > and even then, the tariff for bringing in a vehicle
> > > > was outrageous.
> > > > /Robert
> > > > __________________________________________________
> > > > Use Rhodes22-list at rhodes22.org, Help? www.rhodes22.org/list
> > > >
> > > __________________________________________________
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